Indian Expeditionary Force - Hypothetical Orbat

An expedetionary force comes in many forms and capabilities, depending on the role they train for. The actual TOE would depend on whether they are preparing for a contested or benign entry.

Here is a hypothetical TOE of an Indian "Marine Expeditionary Unit", if it were to be modeled on the US Marine MEU. I hope to flesh it out further and would welcome critical suggestions.

1. Recce platoon: Perhaps staffed by MARCOS (which, incidently was drawn from 340 (I) Bde and it had assisted in beach landing recce during Op. Pawan). If landing craft are inflatable power-boats, they are limited to foot mobility. For their deep recce mission, vehicles will come ashore later from the mechanized company of the BLT.

2. Battalion Landing Team (x 2): Each consists of:

(i) 1 Heliborne Assault Coy: A Sea-King can transport only one platoon at a time, so it will require multiple trips to insert a company. The Magar Class Amphibious Warfare vessel and the LST-L vessels being built has space for 2 helicopters each, but I imagine that the second one should be a smaller helo like the Dhruv or the Chetak for recce and CASEVAC roles. For 2 BLTs, the requirement doubles, but given the current limitations on the number of ships available (see below), it appears that each BLT cannot have its own dedicated Heliborne Assault Coy.

(ii) 1 Mechanized Coy: Even if 1 Coy consists of only 2 Rifle Plts (as opposed to the usual 3) and 1 Coy HQ, for each Mech Coy, we will need 6 APCs like the BMP-2, each capable of transporting 1 section. Each Magar Class vessel has space for 8 APCs and 15 tanks. So unless the number of tanks are reduced in favor of APCs, one "MEU" will need more than 1 Magar Class vessel, which is currently not feasible considering that we have only 2 of these, and possibly a third. So, we could accommodate 12 APCs instead of 8 and reduce the number of tanks (PT-76s) to 10, which will give 3 tank Troops (of 3 tanks each) and 1 Troop HQ tank, if weight balancing considerations are met. With the expected commissioning of 3 new LST-L vessels, the situation changes for both the Heli Assault Coy and Mechanized Coy, permitting 1 Indian "MEU" to be supported by 2 such vessels.

(iii) The equivalent of Charlie Coy (convoy and Humvee) cannot be fully accommodated on one Magar Class vessel there is room for personnel (more than 3 Coys can be accommodated), but no room for vehicles. So 1 vessel of the Mk.2 /Mk.3 Landing Craft will need to be added to the "MEU". Each can carry 1 Coy and, if the two 2 PT-76s and 2 APCs are sacrificed, we could use 4 or 5 4WD mounted with MGs to substitute as the Humvee component. I don't know if convoy trucks can be carried in these vessels for dimensional reasons.

(iv) Support Coy: This will need to be accommodated in the Magar Class vessel along with the Mech and Heliborne Coys and will include Mortar Plt, RL Plt, MMG Plt and Signals Plt. Again, vehicle limitation, not personnel accommodation limitation seems to be a problem. 1 Mortar Plt has 48 crew in a regular IA infantry battn, which translates into 9 mortars, each with 5 members (for an 81 mm mortar). It appears that one regular 4WD jeeps will be able to transport both mortar and ammo.

The obvious omissions in this list are Arty and Service Support.

3. Force Protection and Supply Vessels:

I am assuming that the most probable threats to the MEU will come from ships and aircraft, not from submarines. So each MEU will be escorted by either 1 Type 25 Khukri Class or 1 Veer (Tarantul) Class corvette. The range on the former is about 4000 miles, while that on the latter is only 2000 miles. The range of the Magar Class is 3000 miles. While we have 13 of the Veer Class vessels, we have only 4 of the Khukri Class, so the IN may be willing to spare the latter more for such a role.

Is this level of escort sufficient?

The most significant problem is the limitation of range and speed of these vessels. The distance between Andaman and Nicobar and Kaula Lumpur is only 755 nautical miles, ignoring the need for landing at KL, for the moment. The speed of the Magar Class vessel is 14 knots, which would take 55 hours sailing to cover assuming no stops!!

But if we relax the response speed issue and concentrate more on sustaining forces in the theatre, then we cannot wish away the ship based component. But for such large distances, we need troop transport ships like the B-561 Nicobar Class because of efficiency reasons and we are also assuming that disembarkement will not be contested. However, equipment will still have to be transported by the mother of LST-L. The LPD of the Austin Class seems to be the answer for India, because it can carry 4 LST-L equivalent, each capable to carrying 1 MBT.

Can India be far-sighted when its neighbourhood is in flames?

In response to my previous post, Nitin felt that an Indian expeditionary force cannot project power and resolve, when our political establishment hasn't shown the fortitude to deal firmly with our neighbours' provocations. This is a valid point of view and I want to address it here.

I believe it is a cost-benefit calculation that has prevented GoI from alienating our neighbours any more than we absolutely have to. The cost of living next to a sworn enemy is felt across decades, not months, particularly when there are other powerful and inimical neighbours who will exploit that opportunity to bleed India. For example, the cost of punishing Bangladesh in a military engagement is miniscule compared to the cost of preventing the exponential growth of Chinese influence in Dhaka and the resulting instability in India's North East. The same argument holds for Nepal too. India will have to live with our neighbours playing China off us. We, however, don't have to lose the opportunity to return the favour with China's southern neighbours.

India can ensure the sustained good behaviour of our smaller neighbours if we can make them pay a price for their transgressions, in their dealings with the rest of the world. For example, if Bangladesh's apparel and jute export quota to the West is conditional upon its moderation of anti-India behaviour (a condition that India insists upon, and only too happily fills the shortfall with Indian exports), the new economic reality may force Bangladesh to rethink its provocations against India. A similar trade-off is apparent in India's offer for logistical support to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean rim. It may have staved off a US push to have berthing facilities at Trincomalee - a situation that would not have been under our control, but would have been right under our noses.

The question is - what can bring the West to see India's point of view? That's where I see the value of an Indian expeditonary force that is capable of addressing the West's security concerns away from its shores. The very fact that the GoI seriously considered troops to Iraq before turning down the request (and rightly so), was a demonstration of intent to play a larger role in the world.

Maverick,

I have compiled some postings from various fora on what an Indian expeditionary force would look like. I'll post those here later for discussion.