Siachen Withdrawal - Peace Dividend or Potential Kargil?

Maverick has already commented on the proposed Siachen withdrawal.

I want to add my sense of disquiet at the reported watering-down of the Indian Army's stance of demarcation of the AGPL on an appropriately sized map to a tour of foreign defence attaches of current positions, followed by monitoring of the sanctity of the AGPL via satellite and recon flights. I sense that there is pressure on the MoD to conform to the political contours of the on-going peace process. If true, this is a poor way to handle affairs.

There has been a spate of articles in the Pakistani press that India has been obdurate about moving the process forward, playing no doubt upon their master Musharraf's tune. If this is the Indian gift to Musharraf, it is a poorly thought out one.

The Pakistani Army has everything to gain by provoking India in Siachen after the two sides withdraw. Even the India withdrawal will be hailed as Musharraf's victory and will, in some measure compensate for the Pakistani humiliation over Kargil. After the withdrawal is complete, India cannot depend on anything but the force of arms to deter Pakistani occupation of the vacated posts. This is where the authentication of the current AGPL is absolutely critical, because it provides India the needed reason to attack Pakistani base camps in the event of their transgression. The substitute of getting an informal acceptance via third party defence attaches is, to put it mildly, woolly-headed.

Even with the AGPL enshrined as much as the LoC is, it is not clear that India will go to a shooting war over the Saltoro like it did over Kargil. First, the task of reclaiming the Saltoro is far more difficult and second, the consequences of the Pakistanis occupying the Saltoro is not as adverse as occupying Kargil would have been. Finally, India is striving to disengage from Pakistan and move on greater things. A Pakistani betrayal over Siachen will succeed in either undoing that process of disengagement, or will impact Indian credibility of defending its territorial integrity.

This is a very poor juncture to play such a high-stakes game, particularly with unreliable players like the Pakistanis.

Indian Expeditionary Force - Hypothetical Orbat

An expedetionary force comes in many forms and capabilities, depending on the role they train for. The actual TOE would depend on whether they are preparing for a contested or benign entry.

Here is a hypothetical TOE of an Indian "Marine Expeditionary Unit", if it were to be modeled on the US Marine MEU. I hope to flesh it out further and would welcome critical suggestions.

1. Recce platoon: Perhaps staffed by MARCOS (which, incidently was drawn from 340 (I) Bde and it had assisted in beach landing recce during Op. Pawan). If landing craft are inflatable power-boats, they are limited to foot mobility. For their deep recce mission, vehicles will come ashore later from the mechanized company of the BLT.

2. Battalion Landing Team (x 2): Each consists of:

(i) 1 Heliborne Assault Coy: A Sea-King can transport only one platoon at a time, so it will require multiple trips to insert a company. The Magar Class Amphibious Warfare vessel and the LST-L vessels being built has space for 2 helicopters each, but I imagine that the second one should be a smaller helo like the Dhruv or the Chetak for recce and CASEVAC roles. For 2 BLTs, the requirement doubles, but given the current limitations on the number of ships available (see below), it appears that each BLT cannot have its own dedicated Heliborne Assault Coy.

(ii) 1 Mechanized Coy: Even if 1 Coy consists of only 2 Rifle Plts (as opposed to the usual 3) and 1 Coy HQ, for each Mech Coy, we will need 6 APCs like the BMP-2, each capable of transporting 1 section. Each Magar Class vessel has space for 8 APCs and 15 tanks. So unless the number of tanks are reduced in favor of APCs, one "MEU" will need more than 1 Magar Class vessel, which is currently not feasible considering that we have only 2 of these, and possibly a third. So, we could accommodate 12 APCs instead of 8 and reduce the number of tanks (PT-76s) to 10, which will give 3 tank Troops (of 3 tanks each) and 1 Troop HQ tank, if weight balancing considerations are met. With the expected commissioning of 3 new LST-L vessels, the situation changes for both the Heli Assault Coy and Mechanized Coy, permitting 1 Indian "MEU" to be supported by 2 such vessels.

(iii) The equivalent of Charlie Coy (convoy and Humvee) cannot be fully accommodated on one Magar Class vessel there is room for personnel (more than 3 Coys can be accommodated), but no room for vehicles. So 1 vessel of the Mk.2 /Mk.3 Landing Craft will need to be added to the "MEU". Each can carry 1 Coy and, if the two 2 PT-76s and 2 APCs are sacrificed, we could use 4 or 5 4WD mounted with MGs to substitute as the Humvee component. I don't know if convoy trucks can be carried in these vessels for dimensional reasons.

(iv) Support Coy: This will need to be accommodated in the Magar Class vessel along with the Mech and Heliborne Coys and will include Mortar Plt, RL Plt, MMG Plt and Signals Plt. Again, vehicle limitation, not personnel accommodation limitation seems to be a problem. 1 Mortar Plt has 48 crew in a regular IA infantry battn, which translates into 9 mortars, each with 5 members (for an 81 mm mortar). It appears that one regular 4WD jeeps will be able to transport both mortar and ammo.

The obvious omissions in this list are Arty and Service Support.

3. Force Protection and Supply Vessels:

I am assuming that the most probable threats to the MEU will come from ships and aircraft, not from submarines. So each MEU will be escorted by either 1 Type 25 Khukri Class or 1 Veer (Tarantul) Class corvette. The range on the former is about 4000 miles, while that on the latter is only 2000 miles. The range of the Magar Class is 3000 miles. While we have 13 of the Veer Class vessels, we have only 4 of the Khukri Class, so the IN may be willing to spare the latter more for such a role.

Is this level of escort sufficient?

The most significant problem is the limitation of range and speed of these vessels. The distance between Andaman and Nicobar and Kaula Lumpur is only 755 nautical miles, ignoring the need for landing at KL, for the moment. The speed of the Magar Class vessel is 14 knots, which would take 55 hours sailing to cover assuming no stops!!

But if we relax the response speed issue and concentrate more on sustaining forces in the theatre, then we cannot wish away the ship based component. But for such large distances, we need troop transport ships like the B-561 Nicobar Class because of efficiency reasons and we are also assuming that disembarkement will not be contested. However, equipment will still have to be transported by the mother of LST-L. The LPD of the Austin Class seems to be the answer for India, because it can carry 4 LST-L equivalent, each capable to carrying 1 MBT.

Can India be far-sighted when its neighbourhood is in flames?

In response to my previous post, Nitin felt that an Indian expeditionary force cannot project power and resolve, when our political establishment hasn't shown the fortitude to deal firmly with our neighbours' provocations. This is a valid point of view and I want to address it here.

I believe it is a cost-benefit calculation that has prevented GoI from alienating our neighbours any more than we absolutely have to. The cost of living next to a sworn enemy is felt across decades, not months, particularly when there are other powerful and inimical neighbours who will exploit that opportunity to bleed India. For example, the cost of punishing Bangladesh in a military engagement is miniscule compared to the cost of preventing the exponential growth of Chinese influence in Dhaka and the resulting instability in India's North East. The same argument holds for Nepal too. India will have to live with our neighbours playing China off us. We, however, don't have to lose the opportunity to return the favour with China's southern neighbours.

India can ensure the sustained good behaviour of our smaller neighbours if we can make them pay a price for their transgressions, in their dealings with the rest of the world. For example, if Bangladesh's apparel and jute export quota to the West is conditional upon its moderation of anti-India behaviour (a condition that India insists upon, and only too happily fills the shortfall with Indian exports), the new economic reality may force Bangladesh to rethink its provocations against India. A similar trade-off is apparent in India's offer for logistical support to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean rim. It may have staved off a US push to have berthing facilities at Trincomalee - a situation that would not have been under our control, but would have been right under our noses.

The question is - what can bring the West to see India's point of view? That's where I see the value of an Indian expeditonary force that is capable of addressing the West's security concerns away from its shores. The very fact that the GoI seriously considered troops to Iraq before turning down the request (and rightly so), was a demonstration of intent to play a larger role in the world.

Maverick,

I have compiled some postings from various fora on what an Indian expeditionary force would look like. I'll post those here later for discussion.

Power accretion and projection

This is a follow-up on the discussion at Maverick's World on the value of exhibitionism in deterrence.

While the consensus is to frown upon the lurid display of power, I wonder if a more judicious display won't be of help.

In the Indian context, the emphasis so far has been on matching the Pakistani build-up and in selected areas like ballistic missiles and ship-launched cruise missiles, on matching the Chinese build-up.

Yet, a time of make-believe peace with our neighbours offers India the opportunity to invest in expeditionary forces that are, and will continue to be, the true currency of military power. It works like this.

A force capable of protecting India's interests outside its borders (whether it is aid to a friendly govt., securing energy or commercial interests or providing humanitarian assistance) functions as a marking of territory and a trip-wire for a potential adversary. An attack on this force will be met with a response from a larger Indian force, which the adversary must factor in. The benefit from this force would come in the way of drawing allies towards a country that possesses such an off-shore capability (the flip side is that it also draws unwelcome attention). The key of course is to be credible - the force must be capable of the task it is assigned and that is a function of many political factors, notably whose playground we are in and whether we are welcome there. Such a capability ensures that India will be consulted in regions that are outside its erstwhile sphere of influence and as a quid pro quo, get a constructive audience when it comes to events within its sphere of influence.

Put simply, the current bonhomie with the US, the relative time of peace with Pakistan and the present period of China's focus on Taiwan must be used by India to develop and position a true expeditionary force capable of protecting our oil interests and expatriate population in the Gulf, to give an example.

India-Pakistan de-hyphenation is the merely the broad, strategic expression of India's intent to play a larger role in the world.

I watched the Woodrow Wilson School's simulation of the US National Security Council response to an assassination attempt on Musharraf and the ensuing crisis at one of Pakistan's nuclear facilities, including the possible theft of a nuclear weapon (see here)

The discussion was on expected lines - the need to determine if the attempt on Musharraf was a military coup or a terrorist organization making a play for power and the need to support the next strongest military general in the interests of keeping the military unified and in command. A range of military options including sending US special forces to disarm Pakistani weapons at the compromised nuclear sites to stealth bombing of the sites were discussed.

What struck me as odd was the constant refrain of having to "keep India out" whether by a show of force or by appealing to common interests in the stability of Pakistan. This line of thinking presumes that India wants to go in and neutralize the emerging threat in the first place. If the panel had paused to think how the Indians would view the crisis, they would come to the conclusion that India has no such intentions of doing so whatsoever.

India has no intention of assuming responsibility for what is now the world's problem. All nuclear weapons within the control of the Pakistani military are aimed at India. A nuclear weapon outside the control of the Pakistani military is not aimed at India, it is aimed at the West. The primary responsibility for intercepting and neutralizing them lie with the West. The panel did recognize this fact in passing, but did not take the next logical step of deducing India's reaction to this fact.

By stepping aside and letting the entire world see the real nature of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, India has everything to gain by drawing the world's attentionto even those nuclear weapons that are within the Pakistani military's control, if only to prevent such a scenario from happening again.

Another curious line of thought was the panel's assumption that Iran would be as concerned as the US and the West, at this development. This again reflects the hope that anything other than the West would be the primary target of rogue nuclear weapons. Such a hope is highly misplaced. Any rogue nuclear weapon has but one chance of being used before retaliation wipes out the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the target will be the most lucrative one - the United States or Britain.

Let's explore the two scenarios posited by the panel further.

A. An Islam-pasand military faction making a play for power: The primary motive would be to consolidate its political power in Pakistan and legitimize its hold on the entire Pakistani nuclear inventory. The demands they would make of the US would be less intrusion in Pakistan's internal affairs (relations with political parties, madrassa reforms, intelligence gathering, armed action in NWFP and Balochistan) and greater accomodation of its demands vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India. Ultimately, they would reach an agreement with the US for continued arms and economic support in return for less than what Musharraf is giving the US now.

B. A renegade faction of Islamists intent on securing one or more weapons for use against the West: There would be no direct negotiation with the US in this case. Indeed, in the interests of maintaining a low profile, there would have been no assassination attempt on Musharraf in the first place, which only succeeds in drawing all eyes to that part of the world.

The panel did allude to the possibility that the nuclear loss scare was a diversionary tactic to get the US on the defensive and supportive of a coup. Yet, further deliberations ignored this very real possibility and focussed on military options to neutralize the threat. I might mention in passing that the inverted scenario viz. a puppet regime in Islamabad providing the necessary cover for the theft of a nuclear weapon for use on Western targets, is too far-fetched simply because they will be the target of Western retaliation. Thus, anybody in Islamabad willing to appear in control will be very conscious of the need to prevent a loss of control over its nuclear weapons.

The biggest leverage the US has (contrary to the panel's claim that it was the willingness to hold back India!!) over its interlocuters in Islamabad is the ability to with-hold financial aid until a clearer picture of its nuclear weapons inventory emerges and the US is satisfied that no threat exists. The biggest pitfall the US must avoid is to offer unconditional support to the regime in return for "guarantees" that no nuclear weapon will leave the country. This would leave the US open to further blackmail down the line, and after the new regime has been annointed the real front-line ally in the WOT, to actually deniably allow the leakage of nuclear material outside the country.

While the panel was conservative in its ability to influence the flow of events, a former US Ambassador to Pakistan and the former head (?) of the US DNI who was in the audience, painted a more optimistic scenario of US capabilities - to mobilize support in world capitals and to identify who is the likely successor to Musharraf in the Pakistani military. He, however, did not elaborate on what the USG's likely course of action would be.